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MO1550821 · EX1550543

Microsoft 365 outage of 12 and 13 November 2026

On 12 November 2026 Exchange Online and a long list of other Microsoft 365 services were unreachable for many customers for almost a full day. Microsoft released a preliminary post-incident report on 15 November. This page summarises it in plain language; you can download the report itself.

Preliminary. Microsoft calls this first report preliminary and it may change. The final report follows within five business days of full resolution and replaces this document; the full list of repair items is planned for 20 November. We update this page when it is out.

Download the report (PDF) Our status page for this incident

Microsoft's report as shown in the admin center (Preliminary Post Incident Report, 15 November 2026, PDF, 7 pages). © Microsoft Corporation. The final report replaces this document; the latest version is always in the admin center.

What happened

  • Start: Thursday 12 November 2026, 16:20 UTC. End of the impact: Friday 13 November, 16:10 UTC. The severity varied by region, connection method and time; access may have been partial or intermittent.
  • Exchange Online was hit hardest: most users could not reach their mailbox in Outlook or other mail clients, and email was delayed for many users.
  • Services named: Exchange, Copilot, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive, Defender, Purview, Fabric, Intune, Planner, Power Apps, To Do, Power BI and Universal Print. Services that use Exchange Online mostly stayed online, but the parts that work with Exchange were affected.
  • The report names a software defect in Microsoft's own networking gateway as the cause. During the incident Microsoft also said it was not a cyberattack and that you do not need to change anything in your tenant.

Cause

According to the report, three factors came together and caused a global outage of the networking gateway in front of many Microsoft 365 services:

  1. A latent defect: under certain load, Windows servers became overwhelmed and stopped responding. Inside an internal Windows process, tasks waited on each other (lock contention), which exhausted CPU and memory. The defect came from a fix prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the defect nor the fix applies to other Windows deployments. The rollout began in July, went out safely and gradually worldwide, and ran for more than three months without issues. The test labs did not catch it: they focused on weaker hardware with fewer cores, while the problem is worse on newer machines with more cores.
  2. A surge in load. Microsoft keeps two independent gateway systems for isolation and availability. About fifteen hours before the outage, Teams automatically failed over from the alternative gateway to the primary one, which also serves Exchange Online. That is normal and part of the resilience design, but it raised the load and changed the traffic pattern.
  3. At the same time nearly 14% of the gateway's server capacity was out of service because of an unrelated issue the day before. It was on track to return through routine maintenance and had no effect on its own, because there was enough headroom.

Together, the extra load and the reduced capacity made the gateway hit the July defect, during the peak window of traffic in the United States. Requests built up until servers stopped responding. Automatic traffic management sent users to other healthy servers, but the same defect struck there: a cascade. Within two hours the defect had hit across the fleet, and at the lowest point more than 80% of servers did not respond. Normally partitions between components and regions stop this; because of a separate issue they did not, and the outage spread globally. Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint and the Office apps could fail out of the faulty gateway and so recovered earlier (Teams chats and meetings worked without issue for most of the outage). Exchange Online cannot do that for scale reasons.

Recovery took longer than usual: servers coming back were immediately overwhelmed by the waiting traffic and failed again, automated recovery was not designed for such broad failure, and because the defect was introduced months earlier the usual rollback, flighting and feature flags could not revert it quickly.

How it was fixed

  • Once the defect was confirmed, Microsoft built an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state in Windows. It was applied to part of the capacity at 07:20 UTC on 13 November.
  • Groups of servers were taken out of service, updated and restarted, then returned to service step by step, in large quantities at a time (for example 50% or more of a region).
  • In addition: traffic was moved to alternative connection paths, capacity was added, and the email delivery window was extended so delayed messages were not returned as undeliverable.

Timeline

  • July 2026: The change for the gateway servers starts to roll out and spreads worldwide over several weeks.
  • Thu 12 Nov, 01:07: Teams traffic is automatically failed over to the gateway shared with Exchange Online. Load rises gradually until 16:00; isolated server failures begin in some regions.
  • Thu 12 Nov, 16:20: Alert for Exchange Online and a notice in the Service Health Dashboard under EX1550543. Start of the incident.
  • Thu 12 Nov, 18:27: Notice MO1550821 for the other affected services, including Teams, Copilot and Defender.
  • Thu 12 Nov, 19:00: Microsoft widens the response and pauses all deployments and configuration changes.
  • Thu 12 Nov, 19:20: Finding: the high load is not caused by more traffic, but by many servers being unexpectedly unavailable.
  • Thu 12 Nov, 22:00 - 23:55: The first recovery actions do not work. Servers that come back fail again once they receive traffic.
  • Fri 13 Nov, 00:30 - 01:00: Connection negotiation is identified as the bottleneck: a process on the servers is overwhelmed.
  • Fri 13 Nov, 07:20: Mitigation found and applied to part of the capacity: an update that reverts the defective change.
  • Fri 13 Nov, 08:00 - 11:35: The update is rolled out step by step, first to regions in or entering peak hours. Asia Pacific is partly recovered around 11:00, Europe at 11:35.
  • Fri 13 Nov, 14:17: Global webmail availability is back at expected levels.
  • Fri 13 Nov, 16:10: No more active impact. Extended monitoring and clearing of the email backlog follow. End of the incident.
  • Sat 14 Nov, 04:15: Final updates to EX1550543 and MO1550821.
  • 15 Nov: Date of the preliminary post-incident report.
  • 20 Nov: Planned date for the full list of repair items (final report).

All times are UTC and come from Microsoft's report (shortened). Dutch time is UTC+1 in November.

Repair items (preliminary)

  • A comprehensive list of repair items will be delivered as part of the final report. (planned 20 Nov)
  • Developed an update that returned the connection handling code path to the previously known good state. (completed)
  • Extended the email delivery window so delayed messages were not returned as undeliverable and all queued messages were processed. (completed)
  • Added additional capacity as a proactive measure to help with recovery. (completed)
  • Additional monitoring for traffic-redirection patterns and connection-handling health. (completed)
  • Implemented guardrails for traffic distribution to avoid cascading impact. (completed)

Microsoft's pages

Source

This summary is by 365Fanatic and follows Microsoft's preliminary post-incident report of 15 November 2026. The wording is ours; Microsoft's report is authoritative for the exact text.

Last updated on 16 november 2026.